More titles to consider

Shopping Cart

You're getting the VIP treatment!

With the purchase of Kobo VIP Membership, you're getting 10% off and 2x Kobo Super Points on eligible items.



Seminar paper from the year 2003 in the subject Economics - Macro-economics, general, grade: 1,4, London School of Economics, 22 entries in the bibliography, language: English, abstract: Behavioural evidence of negotiations with incomplete information under time pressure and the underlying normative bargaining models are the core topics of this essay. First, the most important game-theoretical approaches to bargaining settings of the last decades are discussed: Nash's axiomatic approach, Rubinstein's sequential model and negotiation models with incomplete information. Building on this normative ideals, the second section focuses on empirical approaches to test negotiators' behaviour under incomplete information and time pressure. Third, a further research path to negotiations with incomplete information under time pressure is developed. In the Appendix the ultimatum game is solved by a Bayesian-Nash approach.

Ratings and Reviews

Overall rating

No ratings yet
5 Stars 4 Stars 3 Stars 2 Stars 1 Stars
0 0 0 0 0

Be the first to rate and review this book!

You've already shared your review for this item. Thanks!

We are currently reviewing your submission. Thanks!


You can read this item using any of the following Kobo apps and devices:

  • IOS